CVE-2026-41417

Netty vulnerable to HTTP request smuggling and RTSP request injection via DefaultHttpRequest.setUri()

Netty allows request-line validation to be bypassed when a `DefaultHttpRequest` or `DefaultFullHttpRequest` is created first and its URI is later changed via `setUri()`. The constructors reject CRLF and whitespace characters that would break the start-line, but `setUri()` does not apply the same validation. `HttpRequestEncoder` and `RtspEncoder` then write the URI into the request line verbatim. If attacker-controlled input reaches `setUri()`, this enables CRLF injection and insertion of additional HTTP or RTSP requests, leading to HTTP request smuggling or desynchronization on the HTTP side and request injection on the RTSP side. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

Affected

netty

CVSS v3.1 GITHUB

5.3 MEDIUMCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

EPSS

0.34% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, 26th percentile

Published

2026-05-06

Updated

2026-05-07

Proof-of-concept exploits (1)

• advisories/GHSA-v8h7-rr48-vmmv

Security advisories

• netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-v8h7-rr48-vmmv

References

• CVE Record
• NVD entry