CVE-2023-25187
An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN commissioning procedures do not change (factory-time installed) default SSH public/private key values that are specific to a network operator. As a result, the CSP internal BTS network SSH server (disabled by default) continues to apply the default SSH public/private key values. These keys don't give access to BTS, because service user authentication is username/password-based on top of SSH. Nokia factory installed default SSH keys are meant to be changed from operator-specific values during the BTS deployment commissioning phase. However, before the 21B release, BTS commissioning manuals did not provide instructions to change default SSH keys (to BTS operator-specific values). This leads to a possibility for malicious operations staff (inside a CSP network) to attempt MITM exploitation of BTS service user access, during the moments that SSH is enabled for Nokia service personnel to perform troubleshooting activities.
- CVSS v3.1 NVD
- 7.0 HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - CVSS v3.1 MITRE
- 6.3 MEDIUM
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS
- 0.96% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days, 61st percentile
- Published
- 2023-06-16
- Updated
- 2024-12-12
Proof-of-concept exploits (1)
ExploitDB entries (1)
Security advisories
- https://www.nokia.com/about-us/security-and-privacy/product-security-advisory/cve-2023-25…
- https://Nokia.com